Roger T. Johnson's history of the Federal Reserve walks through how the Panic of 1907 — a cascading bank run halted only by J. P. Morgan's private intervention — convinced Congress that the United States could no longer rely on ad-hoc lender-of-last-resort heroics. The National Monetary Commission of 1908, the Aldrich Plan of 1910, the Glass-Owen counter-proposal, and ultimately the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 are the institutional answer to a panic that was still fresh.
The pattern repeats across financial history: durable governance is almost always retrospective. The 1933 Banking Act answered the bank failures of 1930-32. Sarbanes-Oxley answered Enron. Dodd-Frank answered 2008. The institutions look natural in hindsight; in the moment they were the answer to a specific, named failure.
For a trust the takeaway is operational. Each governance backstop in the structure — Protector veto, dead-man switch, multisig quorum, staged-release IPS — should be readable as the answer to a named failure mode. A backstop with no antecedent is either decorative or a sign that the failure mode has not yet been identified.